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Why world's tallest opposition leader is falling in Digital Chakravyuh and Cyber Lakshagriha of Dark Money Group?: India's First Mass Surveillance, Mass Spying Unending Census Case-Part 20
Written By mediavigil on Monday, September 14, 2026 | 11:15 AM
Purochana, the architect and adviser of Duryodhana in the Mahabharata was employed to construct the Lakshagriha (lacquer house) to entrap and kill Pandavas. Dronacharya, the commander-in-chief of Kaurva’s military force had designed the Chakravyuh (military labyrinth) in which Abhimanyu was trapped and killed. India's opposition leaders were detained and housed under carcinogenic asbestos roofs during 21 months of Emergency. National Human Rights Commission has recommended its removal. India's External Affairs Ministry was sold asbestos laden building by its "ally" in Washington D.C which poses a challenge in preparing it for use as an Indian Cultural Centre. In Greek mythology, there is a story about "Shirt of Nessus", the fabric steeped in a deadly, slow-absorbing toxin, which caused the death of Heracles. The shirt was given to him by Deianira, his faithful wife who was misled by Nessus, his enemy to dye the shirt with venom. By the time she realized that she was tricked, it was too late Jane Mayer refers to the USA's Democratic Party's innocent use of a "carpet" manufactured by the company of its political adversary in her book Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right.
Unless one ascertains the real owner of the Lakshagriha, the mind behind designer of the Chakravyuh and the manufacturer of shirt or digital shirt, carpet or digital carpet and gift or digital gift, fatal consequence of residing, entering, wearing, gifting or standing on them cannot be avoided. The collaborators who are master creators of irreality, disguise themselves as loyalists and commit “innocent” fraud on their leaders. Political gullibility manifests itself in myriad ways. More than 50 Prime Ministers and heads of States including 2 from USA and 2 from India have been assassinated. Seven US Presidents have survived assassination attempts but most of the loyalists and intelligence officials who betrayed or were guilty of dereliction of duty towards them have not been made accountable.The opposition leaders including those whose stature was/is taller than the Prime Ministers and Presidents have always been vulnerable.
The cartel of automatic identification (ID) firms operating from Washington, Paris, London, Brussels and Davos responded by getting a “Task Force for preparation of Policy Document on Identity and Access Management under India’s National e-Governance Program” constituted in October 2006.
The cartel deployed Purochana like persons in India’s oldest political party through its youth wing at an unguarded moment in order to impregnate the party with an “innocent” idea of a digital cave akin to modern day Lakshagriha based on automatic identification of individuals. Subsequently, unique clones of Purochana were installed within the union government, state governments, armed forces, ruling parties, opposition parties and media houses.
Notably, there was formal launch of the World Bank’s eTransform Initiative on April 23, 2010, in Washington for converging private sector, citizen sector and public sector and subsequent to Interpol’s e-identity database project and UID related initiatives of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Ignoring the recommendations of a study by LSE against "inappropriate" biometric national ID with "capability to electronically trace and profile all" published in June 2005, the Task Force for preparation of Policy Document on Identity and Access Management submitted a report which disclosed the “Indian” version of the UK’s National Identity Card scheme is being packaged and initiated as Unique ID (UID) scheme "to create a central database of resident in the country". Notably, the 34 members of the “Indian” Task Force included representatives from the Technology Solution Providers like i. IBM, ii. Microsoft, iii. Oracle, iv. Computer Associates, v. Novell, vi. Honeywell, vii. HP, viii. Red Hat, ix. ILANTUS Technologies, x. MPhasis and xi. PwC besides other members from NIC, Department of Information Technology (DIT), National Institute for Smart Government, Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (E-BizProject), Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification Directorate, ECIL, Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, Osmania University, IIT Kharagpur, Indian Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore and Society for Promotion of e-Governance in India. The “Indian” concept of unique identification (UID) scheme was first discussed in 2006. The administrative approval for the project "Unique ID for BPL families" was given on March 3, 2006 by Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology during the tenure Dayanidhi Maran as the minister.
The Planning Commission's Process Committee led by Dr Arvind Virmani was formed on July 3, 2006 to suggest processes for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data fields from core database under "Unique ID for BPL families’ project. The Committee hired Wipro Ltd as its consultant. Wipro prepared a 14-page long "Strategic Vision: Unique Identification of Residents" in July 2006 envisaging the close linkage that the UID Number with the electoral database. Another 15-page long Wipro document entitled "Does India need a Unique Identity Number?" cited example of UK's Identity Cards Act, 2006 to advance the argument for a biometric UID (Aadhaar) Number.
After UK repealed The Identity Cards Act 2006 by The Identity Documents Act 2010 to abandon its National ID card project, the beneficial owners of Wipro, the advocates of biometric UID (Aadhaar) scheme and the donors of ruling partied and opposition parties think their cunning and deceptive silence will justify continued incorporation of biometric identification under the Aadhaar Act, 2016, a clone of UK’s Identity Cards Act, 2006. Having introduced Purochana like individuals in country’s grand old party from the firms that are part of World Ban’s eTransform Initiative, these donors are under the impression that world’s tallest opposition leader will not repeal Aadhaar Act, 2016, the way UK has repealed it.
Unlike the accounting report of the LSE, the report of the Comptroller Auditor General (CAG) of India reveals that CAG was misled to belief that it was Department of Information Technology, not Wipro Ltd which submitted the “Strategic Vision–Unique Identification of Residents" to Process Committee, which approved a UID Authority like entity to be created by executive order. The Process Committee furnished a detailed proposal in this regard. Notably, CAG was misled to ensure that it does not audit the conduct of erstwhile Planning Commission's Process Committee and Wipro Ltd, their consultant who has been accused of 'undue favours' in the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) project by CAG. The report of Dr. S.I. Ahson headed 34-member Task Force for preparation of Policy Document on Identity and Access Management had revealed in April 2007 that the Project Unique ID (UID) is "to create a central database of resident in the country".
A confidential document of UIDAI titled ‘Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India’, leaked by Wikileaks on November 13, 2009 reads: “One way to ensure that the unique identification (UID) number is used by all government and private agencies is by inserting it into the birth certificate of the infant. Since the birth certificate is the original identity document, it is likely that this number will then persist as the key identifier through the individual’s various life events, such as joining school, immunizations, voting etc.” CAG’s audit report failed to audit the deleterious impact of UID/Aadhaar database for the electoral database and the fundamental right of voters.
The establishment of the UIDAI for issuance of 12-digit Unique Identity unique identification (UID)/Aadhaar numbers assigned to the residents of India in January 2009 and the enactment of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits, and Services) Act, 2016, the second e-commerce law through a Money Bill has been detected to be constitutionally questionable by a 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India. In the meanwhile, over 144 crore Aadhaar Numbers have been issued as of March 2026. Initially, UID/Aadhaar Number was declared “voluntary” as a fish bait, drawing lessons from a similar project in Pakistan and subsequently it has been made mandatory in an illegitimate manner. The union government claims that over 2200 social welfare schemes of government using Aadhaar Number. It has also claimed that more than 270 good governance schemes and services are using Aadhaar Number and around 500 entities in the financial and telecom sectors have notified to use Aadhaar Number and numerous private and public service providers employing offline verification of Aadhaar Number for rendering services to individuals.
The commercial czars who are benefiting from Aadhaar Number Online Database were brought to light in Comptroller Auditor General (CAG)'s audit report on UIDAI's performance. But government which misled Lok Sabha on July 20, 2022 about Action Taken Report is now using media blitzkrieg to defend the indefensible Aadhaar Number project in the aftermath of the revelation by CAG’s audit report on the performance of UIDAI, a creature of Aadhaar Act.
Like the CAG’s audit report of 2016, the CAG’s audit report released in April 2022 too makes a specific reference to WIPRO Ltd. There is a reference to Agreement with Data Centre Development Agency (DCDA), Bengaluru and Agreement with DCDA, Manesar with Wipro Ltd. CAG has remarked that “The file related to AMC part was only provided for scrutiny. The file related to selection process of the vendor was not made available. Since the contract involved technical issues, the same was out of the scope of the Audit for scrutiny.” Had UIDAI provided the required files related to “selection process of the vendor”, the audit report would have ensured that sunlight is indeed the best disinfectant.
The Executive Summary of CAG’s audit report begins by talking about “Identification of the right individuals” for “welfare schemes”. Immediately after that it starts talking about how “Citizens were required to furnish multiple documents….to various Government as well as private agencies.” It refers to the inconvenience of “those who did not have any of these identity documents.” It states that in order to “overcome the challenge, the Union Government decided to introduce a unique identity (UID) for the residents of India” in 2009. Contrary to the claims of the promoters of biometric UID/Aadhaar like Nandan Nilekani that “Millions of people without any ID, now have an ID”, the fact is that of all the Aadhaar numbers issued to Indian residents till date – 99.97 per cent had pre-existing identification (ID) documents. This has been revealed in a reply to an application of Ujjainee Sharma and Trishna Senapaty under Right to Information Act by UIDAI. This proves that ‘an inability to prove identity” has not a major barrier to access benefits and subsidies.
CAG’s audit report has detected that “There were instances of issue of Aadhaars with the same biometric data to different residents indicating flaws in the de-duplication process and issue of Aadhaars on faulty biometrics and documents.” It underlines that the Aadhaar database continued to have ‘such questionable’ Aadhaars.
The report asserts that “Issue of Aadhaar numbers to minor children below the age of five, based on the biometrics of their parents, without confirming uniqueness of biometric identity goes against the basic tenet of the Aadhaar Act” unmindful of the fact that “Supreme Court has stated that no benefit will be denied to any child for want of Aadhaar.” It brings to light the fact that UIDAI continues to incur avoidable expenditure on the issue of Bal Aadhaars.
Unmindful of legal complications or inconvenience to holders of Aadhaar issued prior to 2016, UIDAI has failed to identify and fill the missing documents in their database.
The audit report points out that “the quality of data captured to issue initial Aadhaar was not good enough to establish uniqueness of identity.” It reveals that UIDAI is “not in a position to identify reasons for biometric failures and residents were not at fault for capture of poor quality of biometrics.” It also reveals that UIDAI does “not have a system to analyze the factors leading to authentication errors.” UIDAI has failed to “carry out verification of the infrastructure and technical support of Requesting Entities and Authentication Service Agencies before their appointment in the Authentication Ecosystem.” UIDAI has failed to adopt a “data archiving policy, which is considered to be a vital storage management best practice” while maintaining one of the largest biometric databases in the world.
In violation of the Supreme Court’s verdict and in violation of Aadhaar Act 2016 (as amended in 2019), UIDAI is providing “Authentication services to banks, mobile operators and other agencies”. In the aftermath of the deletion of Section 57 which provided for “the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or any body corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force, or any contract to this effect”.
The deletion of this provision was in compliance with the Court’s judgment. In the majority judgment, it is stated that apart from authorising the State, even ‘any body corporate or person’ is authorised to avail authentication services. This can be on the basis of purported agreement between an individual and such a body corporate or person. Even if we presume that the legislature did not intend so, the impact of the aforesaid features would be to enable commercial exploitation of individual biometric and demographic information by the private entities.
The part of Section 57 that allowed for people to voluntarily provide their Aadhaar number to body corporates and individuals, especially on the basis of a contract between the person providing the Aadhaar number and the person acquiring/ authenticating the Aadhaar number, has been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. But the amendment to Section 4 of the Aadhaar Act that deals with ‘Properties of Aadhaar number” re-introduced clauses that have already been ruled to be unconstitutional.
The audit report reveals that the UIDAI has failed to levy penalties on Biometric Service Providers for deficiencies in their performance in respect of biometric de-duplication and biometric authentication. CAG has recommended that “Agreements in this regard should be modified, if required”. This also creates a logical compulsion for States ruled by opposition parties to unsign their MoUs with UIDAI.
The audit of the functioning of UIDAI reveals that UID/Aadhaar has put the privacy of present and future residents, Prime Ministers, Chief Ministers, judges, legislators, soldiers, civil servants and intelligence officials and their families at risk. It shows how contracts awarded by UIDAI in the name of the President of India to favour private entities.
The audit report concludes that “There were flaws in the management of various contracts entered into by UIDAI. The decision to waive off penalties for biometric solution providers was not in the interest of the Authority giving undue advantage to the solution providers, sending out an incorrect message of acceptance of poor quality of biometrics captured by them.”
The report also reveals that “UIDAI had not ensured that the client applications used by its authentication ecosystem partners were not capable of storing the personal information of the residents, which put the privacy of residents at risk. The Authority had not ensured security and safety of data in Aadhaar vaults. They had not independently conducted any verification of compliance to the process involved.”
CAG has detected that although the “Aadhaar Act stipulates that an individual should reside in India for a period of 182 days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for being eligible to obtain an Aadhaar. In September 2019, this condition was relaxed for non-resident Indians, holding valid Indian Passport. However, UIDAI has not prescribed any specific proof/ document or process for confirming whether an applicant has resided in India for the specified period and takes confirmation of the residential status through a casual self-declaration from the applicant. There was no system in place to check the affirmations of the applicant. As such, there is no assurance that all the Aadhaar holders in the country are ‘Residents’ as defined in the Aadhaar Act.”
But CAG is yet to audit contracts by UIDAI that enabled transfer of Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) containing all Aadhaar numbers along with corresponding demographic information and biometric information of Indian residents to foreign and domestic firms, recommend deletion and fix accountability for such a grave act that compromises national security. Notably, Banks and Telecom operators are not mentioned in the Aadhaar Act. All advertisements, SMSs and demands for Aadhaar number are illegitimate and illegal. Supreme Court has declared Section 57 of Aadhaar Act as “Unconstitutional”, outlawing Aadhaar “use for other purposes”.
In such a backdrop, how can world’ tallest opposition leader, his party and allies consider Aadhaar Number database to be deemed legitimate unmindful of the fact that Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act which enabled data transfer to private entities has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India?
It is apparent that the case against Aadhaar Act is pending before a 7-judge Constitution Bench since November 13, 2019 due to lack of judicial courage in the aftermath of the dismissal of Justice Clara Sooronkulova, a judge at the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan by Parliament of the Central Asian state to ensure that biometric identification law is not declared unconstitutional by her.
Justice Sooronkulova said, “everyone has to decide for himself whether he wants them to trust the state or not. If you do not deal with politics, politics will deal with you.” Endorsing her position, Temirbek Asanbekov, a former presidential candidate of Kyrgyzstan, reacted, “By introducing biometric registration as a condition for participating in the election, the state creates artificial barriers. To elect and be elected is a constitutional right and not an obligation. We should bear in mind the general state of information security in the country. Citizens’ data could become accessible by various extortionists or even international terrorists. Who will guarantee that evil-minded people will not gain access to this database?” Her dismissal has widely been noted as an act of governmental interference in judiciary. She was sacked on June 18, 2015.. There seems to be a relationship between the sacking of a judge at the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan and the inability of the 7-Judge Bench to adjudicate against Aadhaar Act, which has been found to be unconstitutional by a Supreme Court’s 5-Judge Constitution Bench of India in Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. [2019] 16 S.C.R.
The opposition parties, citizens’ parties and independent media are yet to adopt the insight from this judgement to promise the repeal of Aadhaar Act and related schemes. UK’s example demonstrates that national electronic-biometric scheme enabling laws can be repealed and initiatives like centralised National ID database and CIDR of UID/Aadhaar Numbers are reversible, not eternal and irreversible. Unlike UK, so far the parties in India have not been able to demonstrate political courage in this regard
Significantly, Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 framed under sections 87 (2) and 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 refers to biometric “technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as 'fingerprints', 'eye retinas and irises', 'voice patterns', "facial patterns', 'hand measurements' and 'DNA' for authentication purposes.” It is apparent that the term “Information Technology” and digital-biometric identity is pregnant with wider meaning which has unprecedented political consequences. The explicit and implicit provisions of the IT law, Aadhaar law and free digital trade deals with countries like USA and UK creates a compelling necessity for globe’s tallest opposition leader to safeguard Indians from Venezuela and Iran like digital gullibility by using political imagination of the freedom struggle against imperialism in myriad disguises.
After the defeat of the Tony Blair led Labour Party government, which knowingly took UK into an illegal and illegitimate war against Iraq, the scheme was scrapped by the coalition government of David Cameron-Nick Clegg led Conservative Party-Liberal Party government. But the its spectre continued to haunt citizens of UK after the return of the Blair-era regressive biometric identification policies of the Labour Party till July 21, 2026, when the new Burnham led Labour Government announced that it has cancelled the digital ID programme, the mother of India’s digitial-biometric ID programme branded as Aadhaar.
Ironically, unmindful of UK’s 2010 Act that repealed UK’s biometric national ID scheme, UK’s firms like Ernst & Young signed a contract agreement in February 2010 with the President of India for UIDAI. In an RTI reply dated October 25, 2013, UIDAI shared a truncated contract agreement with Ernst & Young. The contract agreement states that “the Unique ID will be a random 12-digit number with the basis for establishing uniqueness of identity being biometrics”. It announces that “we will provide a Unique Identity to over 113.9 crore people.” This is evidently a fraudulent announcement because UIDAI with which the agreement has been signed had the mandate to provide Unique Identity to only 60 crore residents of India, and not to 113.9 crore people. It is evident that while the government kept Ernst & Young informed about its motive, it kept states, citizens, the parliament and the Supreme Court in the dark. The contract agreement reveals that “biometric systems are not 100 % accurate” and “uniqueness of the biometrics is still a postulate.” This admission pulverizes the deceptive edifice on which MEITY’s UID/Aadhaar of Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and National Population Register (NPR) of Ministry of Home Affairs rests.
The "Digital Identity Sectoral Analysis Report 2026" of UK's Office for Digital Identities and Attributes, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology based on an updated study of the digital identity sector in the UK which was published on July 8, 2026 reveals that the registered UK location of the 275 digital identity firms. The report has identified domestic and global office locations for all firms in scope. This data suggests that the majority of firms are founded or headquartered in the UK (73%, 202 firms), and over one in four (27%, 73 firms) are founded or headquartered internationally, but have a UK presence via a registered entity. Out of the 202 UK headquartered firms, 73 (36%) appear to have at least one office outside of the UK. The majority of internationally headquartered firms are based in the USA (45) with the remainder from countries such as Switzerland, France, Israel, Australia, the Netherlands, and 12 other countries. For the 73 UK-headquartered firms with a physical presence in international markets, the report found that 214 offices across 51 countries including 15 in India (21%) with reference to UK headquartered companies with a physical presence in India.
Are they working to promote India's supreme national interest, the way UK did so through its presence in India during 1605-1947? Did these offices play any role in the finalization of Article 12.7 on "Digital Identities" and Article 12.12 on "Open Government Data" under Chapter 12 on Digital Trade in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between India and UK signed on July 24, 2025 and which entered into force on July 15, 2026 subsequent to negotiations which were launched on January 13, 2022.
Article 12.7 of the agreement reads: "Digital Identities-1. The Parties recognise that cooperation between the Parties on digital identities will promote connectivity and further growth of digital trade, while recognising that each Party may take different legal and technical approaches to digital identities. Accordingly, the Parties shall endeavour to pursue mechanisms to promote compatibility between their respective digital identity regimes. 2. The Parties shall endeavour to facilitate initiatives to promote compatibility, which may include:(a) fostering technical cooperation between each Party’s implementation of digital identities; (b) developing comparable protection of digital identities under each Party’s legal framework; (c) supporting the development of international frameworks on digital identity regimes; (d) identifying and implementing use cases for the mutual recognition of digital identities; and (e) exchanging knowledge and expertise on best practices relating to digital identity policies and regulations, technical implementation standards and security standards, and the promotion of the use of digital identities."
It is apparent that UK has signed the agreement after the groundwork for control of India’s data wealth and resources has been done by entities like Ernst & Young. As per the contract agreement of UIDAI with Ernst & Young, the latter can keep data of all present and future Indians up to seven years!
Article 12.12 of the agreement reads: "For the purposes of this Article, “government data and information” means non-proprietary data and information held by the central level of government and, to the extent provided for under a Party’s laws and regulations, by other levels of government. 2. The Parties recognise that facilitating public access to and use of government data and information stimulates economic and social development, competitiveness, and innovation. To this end, each Party is encouraged to expand the coverage of government data and information digitally available for public access and use through engagement and consultation with interested stakeholders. 3. Each Party shall provide interested persons with a mechanism to request the disclosure of specific government data and information. 4. To the extent that a Party chooses to make government data and information available to the public, it shall endeavour to ensure that to the extent possible the data and information is in a machine-readable and open format, and can be searched, retrieved, used, reused, and redistributed. 5. To the extent that a Party chooses to make government data and information available to the public, it shall endeavour to avoid imposing a condition that unduly prevents or restricts the user of that data and information from: (a) reproducing, redistributing, or republishing the data and information; (b) regrouping the data and information; or (c) using the data and information for commercial and non-commercial purposes, including in the process of production of a new product or service. 6. The Parties shall endeavour to cooperate to identify ways in which each Party can expand access to, and use of, government data and information that the Party has made public, with a view to enhancing and generating business, and innovation opportunities, especially for SMEs, including start-ups."
A joint reading of the India-UK agreement and the contract agreement between UIDAI and Ernst & Young indicates that The Repealing and Amending Act, 2023 was enacted a low key manner to repeal The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 through Section 2 and the First Schedule of the 2023 Act to undo the omission of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 through the 2019 Act and to facilitate the “Digital Trade” and “Open Government Data” related provisions under India-UK agreement, a bilateral international law. It is apparent that it is an attempt to outwit the judgement by the Supreme Court of India.
After Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between India and UK came into force, Burnham became UK’s Prime Minister on July 20, 2026. A Research Briefing on “Digital ID in the UK” published on September 4, 2026 by the Library of UK’s Parliament wherein, he is quoted as having stated on September 29, 2025 that there was “a risk of an opportunity cost situation here, where something can consume a huge amount of time and actually doesn’t come through”. Now his government has cancelled the national digital ID programme in order to use the savings to fund the government’s priorities on the cost of living. It is evident that LSE’s report stands vindicated. It also vindicates the findings of the report by the India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance which had cited this report to question and trash India’s unique identification Authority of India Bill, 2010. Is there a connection between the date of delayed announcement of cancellation of UK’s National ID scheme by the Labour Party government and the date of entry into force of the digital trade agreement between India and UK? Wasn’t one of the predecessors of Burnham connected with the first family of Infosys Ltd the visiting temples to get the agreement signed? Nandan Nilekani, the first chairman of UIDAI was appointed on June 25, 2009 while serving as CEO and Managing Director of Infosys Limited. How is it that both ruling parties and opposition parties are fond of him? Are they standing on the same carpet?
At the behest of the beneficial owners of foreign military and financial entities, Purochanas have built a coalition of the collaborators to support digital Lakshagriha as something which was inspired by Gandhi’s talisman to wipe the tears of the poorest of the poor. After an irreality of benign digital initiative was created, world’s tallest opposition leader was taken for a ride by making him and his party adopt an automated method of recognizing a person based on a biological attributes, wherein a sample of the biological attribute of the entire population is taken, processed by a computer and stored in a Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) for “one-to-many matching” and “one-to-one matching”.
In her book, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right, Mayer reveals how two tycoons operated behind the scenes for decades to influence politics, policies and laws in the USA. These commercial czars defeated almost all genuine pro-people policies and laws and promoted laws like REAL ID Act to promote biometric identification although it is conclusively established by scientists that it is inherently fallible. The red-and-blue carpet on which Barack Obama stood to take oath as the President of USA after the electoral victory of Democratic Party was custom made in accordance with a government contract, which had been manufactured by Invista, a subsidiary of Koch Industries owned by the two tycoons, the key donors of the Republican Party. Did Obama succeed in doing what his party wished to do while standing on the carpet of the donor of the Republican Party? Can the leader of the oldest party of the leader, his party and his allies succeed without promising to abandon the digital-biometric carpet which has been myopically laid out in India unmindful of its unprecedented lethal consequences for the present and future Indians.
The stature of the world’s tallest opposition leader will get established and reinforced only if he can pierce through the chakravyuh of digital cave architecture created by tycoons, drawing insights from the simile of cave recorded in Plato’s The Republic else he, his party and his allies will meet the fate of Abhimanyu and will be burnt to ashes in the digital Lakshagriha like the leadership in Iran and Venezuela.
Dr. Gopal Krishna
Also read: India's First Mass Surveillance, Mass Spying Unending Census Case-Part 19
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(The author is a practicing advocate and a researcher of philosophy, mass communication and law. His current work is focused on the philosophy of digital totalitarianism and the monetisation of nature. He has appeared before the Supreme Court's Committees, Parliamentary Committees of Europe, Germany and India and UN agencies on the subject of national and international legislations on UID/Aadhaar/NPR, DNA profiling through criminal identification procedures, nuclear damage, consumers, land acquisition, biological diversity, finance, hazardous waste trade, water cycle and corporate crimes since 2001. He is an ex-Fellow, International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC)-University of Potsdam, Germany.)
Political immorality of manufacturing consensus around transfer of Aadhaar Number Online Database for up to 7 years to foreign entities: India's First Mass Surveillance, Mass Spying Unending Census Case-Part 19
Written By mediavigil on Sunday, June 21, 2026 | 6:30 AM
Mahatma Gandhi’s first Satyagraha was against biometric identification
"Politics is the only profession where you can lie, cheat, and steal, and still be respected."
— Mark Twain
“Aaadhaar was launched on September 29, 2010….This is the fastest digital platform to reach a billion, the only non-US one and the only one by a government[1],” claimed Nandan Nilekani, the first Chairman, Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). The claim of biometric unique identity (UID)/ Aadhaar number being a non-US digital platform isn’t factually correct. It was launched long before its launch was announced and several years prior to the arrival of Nilekani to undertake marketing of this Made-in-USA digital product. The swiftness with which first Chairman of UIDAI signed MoUs and contract agreement with states and non-state entities stands in stark contrast with the UIDAI’s reluctance to unsign the MoUs and contract agreements in the aftermath of Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench declaring Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act to be unconstitutional. Notably, the vested interests have prevailed to get the deletion of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act by an amendment, repealed in December 2023. Due to the political immorality and myopia of donor driven the political parties and NGOs, a bizaare situation has emerged wherein, these MoUs and contract agreements with UIDAI co-exist unaltered along with Section 57 of Aadhaar Act although it has been pronounced unconstitutional.
Nilekani was the first full time chairman of UIDAI during July 2009 – March 2014, from where he resigned after joining Indian National congress to unsuceessfully contest Lok Sabha election from Bangalore. It is evident that for him his political career in Bangalore was more important than world’s largest database project. The fact is that his presence was useful only for marketing this questionable digital product. It was a business as usual project which was unfolding since 2006 based on the 14-page long Vision Document of Wipro Ltd prepared for the Arvind Virmani headed Processes Committee of the Planning Commission of India. As far the design and safety of this online database is concerned his presence as a subordinate official of Montek Singh Ahluwalia was/inconsequential. Like Nilekani, the the author had appeared before the Yashwant Sinha headed Parliamentary Standing Committee of Finance to give testimony on Aadhaar Number Online Database and its national security implications. In its 48-page long report, the Parliamentary Committee had debunked all his claims and endorsed the claims of the critics of the online database project. Nilekani was the first and last full time chairman of UIDAI with cabinet minister rank.
Vijay S. Madan had to play the the role second chairman, UIDAI as an additional charge during March 2014 – September 2015, following Nilekani's abrupt resignation. Did he function as an official of cabinet minister rank?
J. Satyanarayana as the third chairman of UIDAI and second part time chirman of UIDAI during during July 2016 – April 2019.
The position of chairman, UIDAI was so consequential that it was kept vacant from April 16, 2019 to August 22, 2023.
Neelkanth Mishra the fourth chairman of UIDAI and its third part-time chairman joined on August 23, 2023 and Whole Time Director of Axis Capital after having worked with at Credit Suisse, HUL and Infosys. He is also part-time member of the Indian Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council. He is a member of the CII’s Economic Affairs Council.
The appointment of Mishra as part-time chairman of UIDAI and Whole Time Director of Axis Capital seems to be aimed at outwitting Supreme Court’s judgement declaring Section 57 as unconstitutional which was omitted on July 23, 2019 by Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 in compliance with Court’s verdict, but this amendment has now been repealed.
Section 57 of Aadhaar Act reads: “Act not to prevent use of Aadhaar number for other purposes under law.- Nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or any body corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force, or any contract to this effect:Provided that the use of Aadhaar number under this section shall be subject to the procedure and obligations under section 8 and Chapter VI.”
Notably, Section 57 is mention 109 times in a 567 page long judgement by the Constitution Bench. The judgement reads: “That portion of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act which enables body corporate and individual to seek authentication is held to be unconstitutional”. It vindicated the submission of the petitioners who had pointed out that “Section 57 is patently unconstitutional inasmuch as it allows an unrestricted extension of the Aadhaar platform to users who may be Government agencies or private sector operators. This provision clearly shows that the impugned Act has a much wider scope than what may legitimately be considered as a Money Bill. Moreover, this provision enables the seeding of the Aadhaar number across service providers and other gateways and thereby enables the establishment of a surveillance state. The impugned provision enables the spread of applications and Aadhaar dependent delivery systems that are provided not from Consolidated Fund of India resources but through any other means. It is submitted that Section 57 also enables commercial exploitation of an individual’s biometrics and demographic information by the respondents as well as private entities. It ensures that creation of a surveillance society, where every entity assists the State to snoop upon an Aadhaar holder.”
The Court observed: “we are of the view that a part of Section 57 does not pass the muster of proportionality doctrine.” Section 57 is untraceable to any of the sub-clauses of (a) to (f) of Article 110 of the Constitution of India.
The judgement reads: “Section 57 in the present form is concerned, it is susceptible to misuse inasmuch as: (a) It can be used for establishing the identity of an individual ‘for any purpose’. We read down this provision to mean that such a purpose has to be backed by law. Further, whenever any such “law” is made, it would be subject to judicial scrutiny. (b) Such purpose is not limited pursuant to any law alone but can be done pursuant to ‘any contract to this effect’ as well. This is clearly impermissible as a contractual provision is not backed by a law and, therefore, first requirement of proportionality test is not met. (c) Apart from authorising the State, even ‘any body corporate or person’ is authorised to avail authentication services which can be on the basis of purported agreement between an individual and such body corporate or person. Even if we presume that legislature did not intend so, the impact of the aforesaid features would be to enable commercial exploitation of an individual biometric and demographic information by the private entities. Thus, this part of the provision which enables body corporate and individuals also to seek authentication, that too on the basis of a contract between the individual and such body corporate or person, would impinge upon the right to privacy of such individuals. This part of the section, thus, is declared unconstitutional.”
In such a backdrop, the deafening silence of the political parties and NGOs under the influence of their Indiana and foreign donors is immoral and indefensible.
The documents accessed through RTI reply dated 25th October, 2013 reveal that this is an impudent misrepresentation of facts. In the contract agreement between the President of India for UIDAI, as purchaser and L-1 Identity Solutions Operating Company, and Accenture Services Pvt Ltd accessed through RTI at clause 15.1 it is stated, "By virtue of this Contract, M/s Accenture Services Pvt Ltd/Team of M/s Accenture Services Pvt Ltd may have access to personal information of the Purchaser and/or a third party or any resident of India, any other person covered within the ambit of any legislation as may be applicable." The purchaser is President of India through UIDAI. The clause 15.3 of the agreements reads, "The Data shall be retained by Accenture Services Pvt Ltd not more than a period of 7 years as per Retention Policy of Government of India or any other policy that UIDAI may adopt in future." Copies of the contract agreement are available with the author. This clearly implies that all the biometric data of Indians which has been collected so far is now available to US Government and French Government because of Patriot Act and French government’s stake in the company in question. In the meanwhile, the ownership of L1 has changed multiple times between US and French entities for inexplicable and intriguing reasons, which India’s political, legal and judicial class seem to have failed to decode.
The disclosures by Wikileaks about the keen interest of US administration in the Aadhaar project underlies that it is interested in knowing about biometric database of the world's largest democracy.[2] General Keith Alexander, as director of USA’s National Security Agency (NSA) had instructed information gathering saying, "sniff it all, know it all, collect it all, process it all and exploit it all”.[3] The aadhaar and related schemes are unfolding in this backdrop.
When asked “whether or not you think by the year 2050 there could be a global system … (which) would be a real influence on knocking down the nation state, which I think needs knocking down.” Nilekani admitted, “There is nothing technologically limiting in having the whole population of the world on the system.” This poses a grave threat to sovereignty of the citizens and the country. He and his project appear quite complicit in unconstitutional act of surrendering the country’s interest in favour of a global system led by ungovernable and undemocratic business enterprises not by democratic legislatures.
It is not known whether Nilekani took oath of office for a Cabinet Minister of the Union of India given the fact that he was the first chairman of UIDAI in the rank of a cabinet minister and was responsible for the creation of world’s most sensitive database using personal sensitive information of Indian residents with the help of transnational corporations from USA, France and UK.
Given the sensitivity of the assignment and given his rank of as cabinet minister as per the Constitution of India, he should have been made to take oath saying: "I, Nandan Nilekani, do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India,] that I will faithfully and conscientiously discharge my duties as a Minister for the Union and that I will do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will."
The contract documents revealed through RTI underline that in the absence of such an oath subversion of the Constitution has happen whose implications have been ascertained by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance and Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology.
It has not been revealed till date whether Nilekanis enrolled for biometric unique identification (UID)/aadhaar number.
As per the Constitution of India, Nilekani should have taken oath saying: "I, Nandan Nilekani, do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person or persons any matter which shall be brought under my consideration or shall become known to me as a Minister for the Union except as may be required for the due discharge of my duties as such Minister." It is not clear whether all the subsequent chairman, part-time chairman, CEOs and Director Generals of UIDAI and their subordinates take oath of secrecy.
It merits exploration as to how officials of UIDAI will be penalized if they formally hands over the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of UID/ aadhaar numbers to foreign governments and companies. What will happen to him and his successors now that it is clear that in the name of awarding contracts to biometric technology companies from US and other countries have been handed over biometric and demographic details of Indian residents? It is noteworthy that his counterpart in Pakistan gave away the entire record of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to USA as has been revealed by the diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks. This was disclosed on June 19, 2012.
Speaking on “Technology to Leapfrog Development: The Aadhaar Experience” at Center for Global Development, Washington, Nilekani admitted, “Now, biometrics has a big history in the world. Biometrics was first used in India in the 1870s when the British used it for land titling, and they also used people's fingerprints to record the registration of documents. Historically, and up until a few years ago, the use of biometrics was essentially in forensics. It was about using biometrics for crime investigation and crime protection….So, fundamentally, biometrics was used for forensic purposes. But, after 9/11, biometrics has increasingly been used for the purpose of surveillance, or security, or for immigration control.” He was delivering the Eighth Annual Richard H. Sabot Lecture on 22nd April 22, 2013 as Chairman, UIDAI. It is evident that Parliament, State legislatures and citizens besides the Supreme Court has been kept in dark about the ulterior motive of the collection of biometric data by foreign companies from USA and other countries.
After Statement of Concern by 17 eminent citizens like Justice V R Krishna Iyer , adverse report of the multi party Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana Court, the order of National Human Rights Commission to the Union Home Secretary Affairs, the admission of a complaint regarding illegal, illegitimate and unconstitutional subordinate legislation for biometric Aadhhar/UID by Parliamentary Committee on Subordinate Legislation, in a series of statements on Twitter, Narendra Modi, the Prime Ministerial candidate of BJP and Gujarat Chief Minister has asked the Indian National Congress led Government, “Were all states on board on Aadhaar?” in the aftermath of the Supreme Court ‘s order of September 23, 2013 rebuking the Government for making it mandatory. Have these concerns become irrelevant for the present Prime Minister?
Modi had said, “When the SC raised these points, the PM must tell nation that did all states and departments approve Aadhar? But you just spent huge money. You need to answer nation for that. What the Supreme Court said today, I raised the similar point three years ago. I told him to convene a National Security Card meeting, consult Chief Ministers, but he did nothing. Nation wants to know from the PM how much money was spent on Aadhar card? Who gained from it? What about the questions the SC raised?”. It is noteworthy t hat even as he raised these questions Gujarat Government continued to act as per the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), it signed with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) for the implementation of aadhaar project. The MoU was signed by V. N. Maira. IAS. Principal Secretary (Planning), General Administration Department, Gujarat Government on June 9, 2010.
State Governments, especially the ones ruled by opposition parties ought to withdraw from the MoUs they have signed with UIDAI. So far they have failed to apply their legal minds to it the way they did in the case of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). They have failed to appreciate that UID, NPR, NCTC and National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is linked and is being linked with Census and Voters’ database.
Unmindful of threat to federalism most States including opposition ruled States have signed a MoU with UIDAI. Surprisingly, the States which were quite vocal about threats to federal structure from Union Home Ministry‘s National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) that integrates 21 sets of databases have been caught unawares by the creation of UID’s Centralized Identities Data Register (CIDR) disregarding the fact that CIDR is going to be converged. State Governments have chosen to listen to consultants who are more interested in making a quick sale of their biometric, identification and surveillance technology products.
In 1906, another Gujarati, Mahatma Gandhi had encountered a similar Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance proposed by the Transvaal Government in the August 22 issue of the Government Gazette required all Indians in the Transvaal region of South Africa, eight years and older, to report to the Registrar of Asiatics and obtain, upon the submission of a complete set of fingerprints, a certificate which would then have to be produced upon demand. Fingerprints were then demanded only from criminals, and the subjection of women to such a requirement had no other objective but the humiliation of Indians. Gandhi understood well that the Ordinance effectively criminalized the entire community and must be challenged. At a meeting held in Johannesburg, 3000 Indians took an oath not to submit to a degrading and discriminatory piece of legislation. This gave birth to Satyagraha. Gandhi later wrote that the ordinance illustrated hatred towards Indians which, if passed, “would spell absolute ruin for the Indians in South Africa.”
The opposition parties must ponder over: How is CIDR of Aadhaar and NPR which also generates Aadhaar 'number different from the ‘register of Asiatics’ opposed by Mahatma Gandhi? If Indians forget the lesson of this resistance movement it would “spell absolute ruin for the Indians” of the present and future generations.
A historic eight-year-long resistance campaign against biometric identification happened from August 1906 to January 1914 in the British colony of Natal, and Boer Republic of Transvaal, South Africa. In August 1906, the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance was signed into law in the Transvaal. It was a humiliating and discriminating law forcing Indians in the Transvaal to register with the ‘registrar of Asiatics,’ submit to physical examinations, provide fingerprints, and carry a registration certificate at all times. Otherwise, Indians and other ‘Asiatics,’ as they were called, could be fined, imprisoned, or deported. A delegation of Indians sailed to London to meet with British Secretary of State Lord Elgin. In 1912, Gopal Krishna Gokhale visited South Africa and expressed his support for the struggle against biometric idnetification. In early 1914, an agreement was reached with the protestors and the Black Act seeking biometric identification was abolished.
Historians rightly say that all history is contemporary history. It was reported on October 6, 20111 that Gujarat Chief Minister wrote to the Prime Minister questioning the need for biometric data collection for National Population Register (NPR) by Registrar General of India & Census Commissioner, Union Ministry of Home Affairs. Gujarat stopped collection of biometric data for creation of the NPR. In his letter to the then Prime Minister, Modi raised objections over both the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which is creating Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar Number and Registrar General of India, which is creating the NPR, collecting biometric data. In his letter to the then Prime Minister, Modi wrote, “there is no mention of capturing biometrics in the Citizenship Act or Citizenship Rules 2009”. He added, “In the absence of any provision in the Citizenship Act, 1955, or rules for capturing biometrics, it is difficult to appreciate how the capture of biometrics is a statutory requirement. Photography and biometrics is only mentioned in the Manual of Instructions for filling up the NPR household schedule and even in that there is no mention of capturing the Iris”. After Gujarat stopped collection of biometric data, the then Union Minister of Home Affairs sent a letter to Modi in August 2011 pointing out that creation of the NPR was a “statutory requirement” under the Citizenship Act, 1955, and “once initialized, has to be necessarily completed”. The Union Minister of Home Affairs had also requested the CM to instruct state government officers to cooperate in creation of the NPR. This was when the entire media, the citizens and the political class was hoodwinked into believing that there was a rift between UIDAI and Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
But Modi chose to side with UIDAI in an apparent rebuff to MHA. Modi kicked off UID/Adhaar project in Gujarat on 1st May, 2012 by giving his biometric information for his aadhaar/UID number and enrolled under the UIDAI project. Strangely, Modi did not object to his biometric identification under UID as he did with regard to NPR. Modi did so despite the fact that Yashwant Sinha headed Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) on Finance rejected the UID project and the UID Bill in its report to the Parliament on December 13, 2011. However, it may be noted that one sentence of the PSC report appears to endorse biometric NPR. Was it a case of Sinha trying to side with Chidambaram and Modi trying to side with Nilekani? It appears that Modi has been taken for ride with regard to the UID/Aadhaar and Sinha with regard to NPR as they failed to see through the ‘approved strategy’. Now it is clear that the staged rift that was created between Home Ministry and Planning Commission’ UIDAI on UID and NPR was motivated and was meant to take legislatures, citizens, States and media for a ride. Both Modi and Sinha got misled because Chidambram left the Home Ministry and became the Finance Minister. Notably, the UIDAI was the proposed by the Ministry of Finance in 2009. Thus, both were outwitted by Chidambaram. Modi’s letter to the Prime Minister objecting to the biometric data collection sought by Chidamabram was made irrelevant. Modi’s biometric data is now the property of UIDAI and because UIDAI and NPR data is to be collated ‘as per approved strategy’ it is also the property of Registrar General of India’s NPR to which he had objected.
The Terms of Reference No. 8 of Planning Commission’s notification dated January 28, 2009 that created Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) in pursuance of the 4th meeting of the Empowered Group of Ministers, states, “Take necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR and UID (as per approved strategy)”.
A Prime Minister’s Office which has been promoting biometric data collection purportedly to make delivery of social welfare programs leak proof itself isn’t leak proof. Given a choice between leakage or theft of citizens database of sensitive personal information and leakage of public distribution system and delivery social welfare services what would be be chosen and which can be plugged more easily.
It must be recalled that database of Greece has been stolen as per Reuters and the database of Pakistan and Egypt has been handed over to US as per the diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks.
In UID/Aadhaar Enrolment Form, Column 9 reads: "I have no objection to the UIDAI sharing information provided by me to the UIDAI with agencies engaged in delivery of welfare services". In front of this column, there is a "Yes" and "No" option. Irrespective of what option
residents of India exercise (which is being ticked automatically by the enroler in any case as of now), the fact is this information being collected for creating Centralized Identity Data Register (CIDR) and NPR (column 7) will be handed over to biometric technology companies.
At a lecture on 23rd November, 2012, Nilekani ominously stated that if you do not have the Aadhaar you will not get the right to rights. UID is like a financial address for the people. The question is if Aadhaar is only an identifier of residents of India how does it accord to itself an inherent right to approve or disapprove rights of citizens to have rights? Karnataka based groups have informed that the name Aadhaar is linked to the Aadhar Trust NGO of Nilekani that worked in the matter of Bangalore Agenda Task Force from 1999 to 2004.
Overwhelmed by the marketing blitzkrieg of biometric technology vendors from USA and other countries, public institutions in India are yet to pay heed to the sane decisions of Governments of USA, Australia, China, UK, France and Germany who have decided against indiscriminate biometric identification.
“UID will create a digital caste system because going by the way it is now being implemented, if you choose not to be part of the system, you will be the modern-day equivalent of an outcast. In theory, you are supposed to have the freedom to choose but in reality, the choice will only be whether to be left out and left behind[4],” warned Jacob Appelbaum, computer security researcher, hacker, activist, and a spokesperson for WikiLeaks. Nilekani and his ilk are promoting digital caste system.
While presenting the Union Budget 2009-10, the then finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee announced the setting up of the UIDA to “establish an online database with identity and biometric details of Indian residence and provide enrolment and verification services across the country” in paragraph no. 64 of his speech allocating 120 crore to it. Coincidentally, immediately after this announcement, he underlined the need for “the modernisation of police force in the states” in paragraph 65 of the speech that dealt with “national security”. In this speech of 6th July, 2009, the finance minister informed Parliament about the arrival of Nilekani without naming him saying, “This project is very close to my heart. I am happy to note that this project also marks the beginning of an era where the top private sector talent in India steps forward to take the responsibility for implementing projects of vital national importance.”[5]
This was before the UID Bill (The National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010) was introduced in the Parliament and rejected by the parliamentary standing committee on finance in its report to Parliament in December 13, 2011 raising serious national security concerns.
The Economic Survey 2008-2009 reads: "These IDs will form the base of a multi-application smart cards (MASC) system that can be used to empower the poor and ensure that they get the full benefits of all programmes such as NREGA, PDS, publically provided education, skill development, health services, social security (to personal at special risk) and fertilizer subsidy." It added: "A household ID could be created simultaneously or in parallel by linking it to a set of UIDs of individuals constituting the household." The ground reality is that UID/Aadhaar Number Online Database has dis-empowered the poor and deprived them the full benefits of programmes such as NREGA, PDS, education, skill development, health services, social security and fertilizer subsidy because of rampant failure of biometric technology, which is admittedly “inherently fallible”.
The Economic Survey 2025-2026, claims that economy-wide adoption of public digital infrastructure, including Aadhaar Number, Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Goods and services Tax Network (GSTN), has reduced transaction and compliance costs. [7] These claims are an exercise in fraudulent misrepresentation of facts because savings are being claimed without disclosing the total cost of the Aadhaar Number Online Database system.
Besides the fact is that the World Bank had estimated a saving of $11 billion per annum. Government relied on it. The claim footnoted a 2011 article, which made no such claims. The article used the $11 billion figure to talk about transfers from five schemes, and talked only about the value of the transfers. Therefore the World Bank claim stands discredited. The figure was the total disbursement. There was no mention of savings. After this was revealed, the World Bank replaced the citation with its own footnote. But the government continues to make its questionable claims about savings.
Notably, Nilekani, the first chairman of UIDAI had joined UIDAI not in person but in his role as co-chairman of the board of directors of Infosys Technologies Limited, which he co-founded in 1981 and served as director on the company's board since its inception to July 2, 2009. This appears manifestly incestuous. It was the chairman, Infosys Ltd, an artificial person who was asked to head UIDAI, and a not a natural citizen.
The transnational companies like Ernst & Young. L1 Identities Solution (in myriad disguises), Safran and Accenture are involved in this exercise. Ironically, these companies are taking the personal sensitive information for “seven years” and Government is paying for it.
Legislators and policy makers in particular and the political class in general must examine as to why bankers are immensely interested in biometric identification and verification of citizens. Biometric identification implies that movements of present and future generations of citizens are tracked like those of bacteria under a microscope.
What is ironical is that while it is inevitable that no centralized electronic database of biometric information can be made leak proof in the post Wikileaks and Edward Snowden world, the bankers, biometric technology companies and their collaborators are marketing it as an answer to increasing demand for identity proof and identity protection from citizens.
In 1998, National Biometric Test Center, San Jose State University set up by the Biometric Consortium, which is the U.S. government interest group on biometric authentication was asked to testify to the USA’s House Committee on Banking and Financial Services hearing on “Biometrics and the Future of Money”. This testimony of May 20, 1998 was reprinted under the title, “Biometric Identification and the Financial Services Industry. This centre emerged from a meeting of Biometric Consortium held in 1995 at the FBI training facility. This Test Centre has defined biometric authentication as “the automatic identification or identity verification of an individual based on physiological and behavioral characteristics”.
Whatever is happening in India is an exercise in imitation of what was attempted in USA through the REAL ID Act of 2005 amidst bitter opposition. The US Senate never discussed or voted on the REAL ID Act specifically and no Senate committee hearings were conducted on the Real ID Act prior to its passage exposing its undemocratic character and the bill's proponents avoided a substantive debate on a far-reaching piece of legislation by attaching it to a "must-pass" bill. Barack Obama categorically opposed it during the 2008 presidential election campaign. As of 2008, all 50 states have either applied for extensions of the original May 11, 2008 compliance deadline or received unsolicited extensions.
As of October 2009, 25 states have approved either resolutions or binding legislation not to participate in the program. Among other concerns they have argued that it infringes upon states’ rights.With Janet Napolitano, a prominent critic of the program as the head of USA’sDepartment of Homeland Security, the future of the law appears sealed. On March 5, 2011, the USA’s Department of Homeland Security postponed the effective date of the Real ID Act. Through a Document Number FR 5-08 Department of Homeland Security announced that US states would need to be in compliance with the REAL ID Act by December 1, 2017. Bills have been introduced into US Congress to amend or repeal it. The controversial, $4 billion Real ID initiative was meant to provide secure licenses in the hands of 245 million Americans by 2017. The new proposal,Providing for Additional Security in States’ Identification (PASS ID) Act is expected to eliminate many of the more burdensome technological requirements. The BILL is meant to repeal title II of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and amend title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to better protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personally identifiable information collected by States when issuing driver’s licenses and identification documents, and for other purposes. It is surprising as to why Government of India which has been keen on emulating REAL ID Act when it was adopted in USA has developed cold feet in following the same example when it is practically abandoned there.
In India, when one looks at the definition of the “Biometrics” which “means the technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as ‘fingerprints’, ‘eye retinas and irises’, ‘voice patterns’, “facial patterns’, ‘hand measurements’ and ‘DNA’ for authentication purposes” as per Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 under section 87 read with section 43A of Information Technology Act, 2000, it becomes clear that the plan of data collection does not end with collection of finger prints and iris scan it goes quite beyond it.
The fact remains biometric data like finger print, voice print, iris scan and DNA do not reveal citizenship. While use of biometric technology, an advanced technique for the identification of humans, based on their characteristics or traits is unfolding there is agency within India to. These traits can be face, fingerprint, iris, voice, signature, palm, vein, and DNA. DNA recognition and vein recognition are the latest and most advanced types of biometric authentication. Biometric technology is being deployed in the application areas like government, travel and immigration, banking and finance, and defense. Government applications cover voting, personal ID, license, building access, etc.; whereas travel and immigration use biometric authentication for border access control, immigration, detection of explosives at the airports, etc. Banking and finance sector use biometric authentication for account access, ATM security, etc.
The International Biometric Industry Association has listed potential applications for including voter registration, access to healthcare records, banking transactions, national identification systems and parental control. Indeed “Biometrics are turning the human body into the universal ID card of the future”. Unmindful of dangerous ramifications of such applications, if citizens and political parties concerned about civil liberties do not act quickly enough biometric ID’s are all set to be made as common as email addresses without any legal and legitimate mandate. Biometric information includes DNA profiling wherein biological traits are taken from a person because by their very nature are unique to the individual and positively identifies that person within an ever larger population as the technology improves.
In its April 13, 2013 report titled ‘Regional Economic Outlook, Asia and Pacific Shifting Risks, New Foundations for Growth’ as part of World Economic and Financial Surveys, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that “India is planning to enhance its existing cash transfer program and identification system in connection with the ongoing subsidy reform”.
Elaborating it further it reports how “India has also been rapidly expanding its biometric Uniform Identification system (aadhaar), which will establish an accurate and paperless means of identifying all Indians by 2014. This program will also present large opportunities for savings. A nationally uniform, biometric database would cut down on leakages from outdated biographical information, ghost identification, double registration, and other losses, which have been estimated in the range of 15–20 percent of total spending.”
Underlining the convergence underway, it says, “The integration of these two programs, aadhaar and direct cash transfers, promises further savings but will involve many challenges: the timeframe for bringing India’s population of 1.2 billion into the aadhar program could extend beyond 2014, and integrating this database with information on individuals eligible for subsidized fuel will take time. Shifting the fertilizer subsidy from companies to individual farmers and building up the capacity to deliver payments electronically could also be challenging in such a large country. But the total savings could be substantial: if the combination of direct cash transfer and aadhaar eliminates the estimated 15 percent leakage cited above for the programs being integrated, savings could total ½ percent of GDP in addition to the gains from the better targeting of spending on the poor.”
Such claims are figments of IMF’s imagination unless the total estimated budget of the UID/Aadhaar project is disclosed. It is irrational for anyone to reach inference about benefits from any project without factoring in the costs but World Bank Group is doing it and endorsing similar acts by UIDAI.
Not surprisingly, having applauded both biometric identification and cash transfer, the World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim underlined the importance of the subject to the World Bank Group in his opening remarks at the Bank's Development Economics Lecture series on April 24, 2013 in Washington where Chairman, Planning Commission’s Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and Chairman, Infosys Technologies, Nandan Manohar Nilekani spoke about the unique system for the biometric identification of Indian residents. It may be recalled that Robert B. Zoellick, the then World Bank Chief met Chairman of the UIDAI on December 4, 2009. What transpired at these meetings is not in public domain.
In the aftermath of these meetings what is least talked about is that the E-identity and UID/aadhaar related projects are part of World Bank’s eTransform Initiative formally launched on April 23, 2010 for converging private sector, citizen sector and public sector and Interpol’s e-identity database project. This along with the then Union Finance Minister, Pranab Mukherjee’s announcement in January 2011 voluntarily seeking full-fledged Financial Sector Assessment Programmee by IMF and the World Bank merits attention of the legislatures and concerned citizens.
In April, 2010 L-1 Identity Solutions Inc. (which has now been purchased by biometric technology company Safran group, a French corporation signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between L-1 and the World Bank was signed as part of the launch of the initiative at a World Bank Spring Meeting event attended by many developing country Ministers of Finance and Communications. It claimed that this collaborative relationship with the World Bank is meant to improve the way governments in developing countries deliver services to citizens as part of the launch of the World Bank eTransform Initiative (ETI).
The World Bank's ETI seeks to leverage Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to build a knowledge sharing network that helps governments of developing nations to leverage the best practices of practitioners like L-1 and others to improve the delivery of social and economic services. The knowledge sharing network will focus on areas such as electronic Identification (eID), e-Procurement, e-Health and e-Education; areas vital to promoting the participation of citizens in democratic processes, such as voting, and helping undocumented citizens get access to health and welfare programs. The World Bank is currently funding 14 projects related to e-government and e-ID around the world. Are citizens supposed to believe that the World Bank Group is working to ensure that India's national interest and its citizens’ rights are protected?
"The speed and precision with which developing countries administer services is dependent upon many factors, not the least of which is the ability to verify the identities of those receiving services," said Mohsen Khalil, Director of the World Bank's Global Information and Communication Technologies Department in a statement.
Robert V. LaPenta, Chairman, President and CEO of L-1 Identity Solutions had said, "We believe that identity management solutions and services can make a significant contribution to society and undocumented citizens in developing countries, bringing them out of anonymity and helping establish their place and participation in society and affirming their rights to benefits they are entitled to receive as citizens."
It has been underlined that the “game-changing UID applications in payments, savings, and other tools for driving efficiency and transparency” using “already created one of the world's largest platforms (that is) transforming not only authentication but also everything from government payments to financial inclusion”. In effect, it is a case biometric profiling by the IFIs who have vested interest in surveillance of financial transactions.
In his book Imagining India, Nilekani refers to Bank’s economist, Hernando de Soto's book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else to argue that national ID system would be a big step for land markets to facilitate right to property and undoing of abolition of right to property in 1978 in order to bring down poverty! In the post capitalist and post socialist era, such assumptions of triumph have been found to be deeply flawed. In fact even the title of the books sounds weird in the post financial crisis era.
In the Parliament, on April 23, 2013, Abdul Rahman, MP asked the Union Minister of Home Affairs (MHA) about the percentage of the population covered under UID (Aadhaar), National Population Register (NPR) and Voters Identity Card, so far and the areas where information provided in these UID (Aadhaar), NPR and Voters Identity Card overlap; and the steps taken to avoid overlapping of the information contained therein. The reply was given but what it did not disclose is that the overlapping is deliberate because the real motive of the entire exercise is to ensure convergence of all pre-existing databases and the databases under creation as envisaged by the IFIs.
Press Information Bureau (PIB), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India issued a release dated 22nd July, 2015 titled "Linking of NPR data with Aadhar Numbers" It reads: "The Government has decided to update the National Population Register (NPR) and seed the Aadhaar number in NPR database at an estimated cost of Rs. 951.35 crore. The field work would be completed by March 2016. This updated NPR database along with Aadhaar Number would become the mother database and can be used by various government departments for selection of beneficiaries under their respective schemes. There is no duplication of efforts as all the agencies namely Registrar General of Citizen Registration India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Unique Identification Authority of India, NITI Aayog, Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) Mission, Ministry of Finance and State/Union Territories Governments are working in close coordination for completion of the above exercise. This was stated by the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Shri Haribhai Parathibhai Chaudhary in a written reply....in the Lok Sabha."[6] As apprehended the convergence of the initiatives of MHA and UIDAI was part of the design the very outset.
It does not appear to be a coincidence that Lyon, France based Ronald K Noble, Secretary General, INTERPOL, and world’s largest police organisation too has called for global electronic e-ID identity card system. When Nilekani was asked about the relationship of UID/Aadhaar with the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) in an interview by Hard News magazine, his reply was ‘No Comments’. Isn’t global electronic e-ID identity card system proposed by INTERPOL, e-Identity project of World Bank Group and UID/aadhaar related databases linked? Is ‘No Comments’ a convincing answer?
Biometric documentation of undocumented citizens in developing countries which is underway in some 14 developing countries under ETI is aimed at bringing them out of anonymity without any legal mandate. Such documentation of sensitive data of citizens facilitates bullying and invasiveness by the state and international financial institutions.
Identifying citizens biometrically is an exercise in empire building by ‘commercial czars’ and turning citizens in to serfs. Modern day Jaichands, Mir Zafars, Jeewan Lals and Mirza Ilahi Bakshis are collaborating to help empire builders to earn myopic rewards through attempts to compromise citizens’ sovereignty for good.
The journey of biometric identification and numbering of Indians commenced a year after the first war of India’s independence was brutally suppressed by the army of British East India Company with the help of collaborators who like fifth columnists. The first systematic capture of hand images for identification purposes initiated by William Herschel, a civil servant in colonial India in 1858. It is noteworthy that in 1898, Edward Henry, Inspector General of the Bengal Police established the first British fingerprint files in London.
Referring to the British victory over Indians in 1857, William Howard Russell of London Times wrote: “Our siege of Delhi would have been impossible, if the Rajas of Patiala and Jhind (Jind) had not been our friends”. The seize of the database of personal sensitive biometric information of all the Indians would have been impossible but for the help of ‘commercial czars’ and the complicity of civil servants and ministers.
Occupy Wall Street Movement has a pithy slogan ‘Empire is on the Wall Street’. The exercise of biometric identification of citizens is a comprehensive intelligence initiative with financial surveillance at its core. The personal sensitive information like biometric data that is collected in myriad disguises and through numerous tempting claims about its benefits is going to be purchased by banks and other financial institutions to be correlated with other data, and used for purposes that was neither agreed nor foreseen. This data is bound to be stolen or illegitimately released, exposing citizens to risks of profiling, tracking and grievous embarrassments as has happened in the case of Greece, Egypt, Pakistan and UK.
So far legislators and citizens have failed to make bring World Bank Group and other international financial institutions under legislative oversight. A situation is emerging where if the pre-existing databases like electoral database, census and other databases which are under preparation is converged, these unaccountable and undemocratic financial institutions will never come under parliamentary scrutiny. The identification and surveillance technology providers are appear to be aiding an empire of a kind where every nano activity is under the vigilance of the Big Brother.
The flawed assumption of Government of India that the benefits of biometric systems are sufficient to warrant use of biometric technology for financial transactions is misplaced. The citizens who are succumbing to such presumption are doing so because they are not informed about potential risks. The blatant use of financial rewards akin to bribes to promote citizen’s participation in biometric identification programs sets a very harmful precedent as it violates the principle of free and informed consent. Informed citizens and democratic legislatures can respond to it only through non-cooperation, civil disobedience and voting against parties which support the banker-biometric technology vendor nexus.
[2] http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/12/09STATE129198.html
[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-place-to-hide-by-glenn-greenwald-on-the-nsas-sweeping-efforts-to-know-it-all/2014/05/12/dfa45dee-d628-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html
[4] http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/criminals-will-be-able-to-crack-uid-system-easily-jacob-appelbaum-113053100728_1.html
[5] Union Budget Speech 2009-10
[6] http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=123480
[7] Economic Survey 2025-2026
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Dr Gopal Krishna
(The author is a practicing advocate and a researcher of philosophy, mass communication and law. His current work is focused on the philosophy of digital totalitarianism and the monetisation of nature. He has appeared before the Supreme Court's Committees, Parliamentary Committees of Europe, Germany and India and UN agencies on the subject of national and international legislations on UID/Aadhaar/NPR, DNA profiling through criminal identification procedures, nuclear damage, consumers, land acquisition, biological diversity, finance, hazardous waste trade, water cycle and corporate crimes since 2001. He is an ex-Fellow, International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC)-University of Potsdam, Germany. He is a member of Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (MCRG). He is also the editor of www.toxicswatch.org.)
